The summer of 1995 was marked by a severe drought in the New York City metropolitan area. The lack of rainfall contributed to the inordinate number of multiple alarm brush fires throughout the city. On the eastern end of Long Island in Suffolk County, fire fighters from almost every department on the island were battling a wildfire in The Hamptons that burned for several days.

On August 24, the FDNY sent 10 engines, 2 battalion chiefs, and staff officers for mutual aide. On August 26, 5 additional units were dispatched for relief. At 7:30 P.M. that night, Suffolk County Fire Command notified the FDNY that our services were no longer required, and that all units were en route back to the city. This turned out to be a fortunate turn of events. City fire fighters didn't know it yet, but they were about to have one of the longest nights in recent history.

The St. George Hotel is a complex maze of 9 individual buildings constructed between 1885 and 1933. In all they occupy an entire city block that measures 200 x 400. With it's spectacular view of lower Manhattan and salt water swimming pool, it was THE place to stay in Brooklyn.

Changing times and economy took a toll on the complex. Eight of the buildings were converted for residential use. Of those 8 buildings, 2 had been vacated and remained vacant for years. The Clarke Building, 10 stories 75 x 90, and the Marquee Building, 12 stories 50 x 85, became home to vagrants. Though the entrances to the buildings were boarded up, the resourcefulness of the homeless prevailed. All 9 buildings were interconnected via the basement and they made their way from the basement of the St. George; parts of which were being used to house homeless people.

At 0331 hours of August 27, the Brooklyn central office received a call reporting smoke in the area around the St. George Hotel. The first arriving units checked in with hotel personnel but they had no indications of a fire there. A fire fighter on the roof of the hotel spotted fire in the rear of a building down the block and the 10-75 was transmitted.

Ladders 118 and 110 forced entry to 51 Clark St (The Clarke Building) and fire fighters carrying 2.5 inch roll-ups ascended the stairs. They were met by heavy fire on the 9th floor and hooked up to the standpipe on the 8th. That proved to be in vain as the standpipe system was vandalized and useless. Members from Engine 226 managed to get a 2 1/2 inch line in operation by lowering their roll-ups out a window but they had to abandon the line and retreat as the Red Devil was already way ahead of them.

Fire was spreading rapidly through holes in the floors and open elevator shaft to the floors above, and laterally through open doors to exposure 4 (The Marquee Building). With conditions deteriorating quickly, a withdrawal was ordered and an exterior attack began.

"Deteriorating quickly" is an understatement. Within 47 minutes of the 1st alarm, the 5th alarm was transmitted as fire completely filled The Clarke Building and the upper floors of The Marquee Building. As the interior of The Clarke Building collapsed, huge flaming embers driven by the high heat rose above the 31 story Tower Building (111 Hicks St.)

The Tower Building is a fire-resistive type construction measuring 172 x 150, irregularly shaped. The rear of the building was directly exposed to the fire and heat emanating from the Clarke Building. Seven apartments were on fire simultaneously.

Atop 60 Pineapple St. (The Pineapple Building) was a water tank used to increase water pressure to upper floors of high rise buildings. A combination of flying embers and high heat caused this structure to ignite spontaneously. Fearing that the tank would collapse, Rescue 3 and the Collapse Unit were assigned.

Since the Clarke, Tower, and Pineapple Buildings front on 3 different streets, 3 separate sub-commands were setup. If you count only the engines, ladders, and battalion chiefs, there were 110 pieces of apparatus at the fire scene. The streets of Brooklyn Heights are very narrow and many units had to park their apparatus blocks away from the fire building. Giving instructions to the incoming units was the responsibility of the radio dispatcher.

I can't relate in writing what the air traffic was like for the first hours of the operation. Most of the responding units required instructions on where to respond; sub-incident commanders screaming for additional units; staff chiefs and department brass requesting information. It seemed that all ears were on Brooklyn. This created an exceptionally stressful situation for the radio dispatcher.

This intense situation was handled adroitly by Jeanne Williams. With most of the personnel in the central office busy preforming their respective tasks, she was operating unassisted.

Jeanne is a 21 year veteran of the civil service system, and spent the last 12 years in the NYPD's communications section before coming to the FDNY in 1993. Her experience on the Citywide-S.O.D. radio greatly aided her in handling this event.

The tour supervisor that night was Eugene Naylor, a 26 year veteran of the FDNY who spent most of his years in Brooklyn. He was busy with the Decision Dispatcher assigning units and contacting the other boroughs to arrange for additional companies. Staten Island was the only borough that did not supply Brooklyn with additional apparatus.

The remainder of the dispatch force in Brooklyn that night was Michael Esposito, Connie Brown, Thelma Irving, Vincent Como, and Carlos Sanchez. All received a commendation from the Fire Alarm Dispatchers Benevolent Association for extraordinary professionalism, and are being considered for the O'Brian award (an administrative award given by the Department for excellence in the communications bureau.)

The USFA issued a report on this fire. (Requires Acrobat reader.)

77 - 55+ - 461 51 Clark St.

0333 BOX TRANSMITTED    E224 E207 E226 L118 L110 BC31
0344 10-75              E204 BC35 SQ01
0356 7-5                L101 DC06 RS02
0401 S/C                L119
0403 2-2                E205 E219 E211 E279 L131 BC57
                        E210 MW01 E009 ST01 E284 ST03                     
                        FC01
0405 S/C                L105
0406 3-3                E239 E209 E221 E216 L108 MK01 AM02 TS01
0408 S/C                E220 BC32 BC01 (BC01 replaces BC57,OOS)
0411 S/C                L009
0411 4-4                E202 E235 E280 E230 L105 DC01
0416 S/C                SB02
0419 5-5                E212 E006 E004 E010 L015
0420 S/C                DC07
0424 S/C                RS01
0434 S/C                L102
0437 S/C                BC38
0445 S/C                RS03 L104 L132
0451 S/C                BC06 BC44
0506 S/C                E005 E229 E015 L146 L122 BC57
0519 S/C                E217 E055 E238 L035
0528 S/C                E214 E240 E249 L018 L005
0650 PROBABLY WILL HOLD
0705 UNDER CONTROL

Box 77 - 22 - 462 80 Pineapple St.

0449 BOX TRANSMITTED    E222 E281 E278 L001 L149 BC48
0449 2-2                E227 E332 E252 E021 E330 L147
                        L012 L010
0622 S/C                E245
0623 S/C                BC45
0650 PROBABLY WILL HOLD
0709 UNDER CONTROL

Box 77 - 33 - 478 111 Hicks St.

0504 BOX TRANSMITTED    E283 E242 E318 L176 L114 BC45
0507 S/C                BC04
0509 S/C                BC44
0510 2-2                E258 E033 E246 E237 E231 L106 L008 L006
0513 S/C                DC05
0516 S/C                RS05
0522 3-3                E293 E054 E024 E028 L147 BC21 BC28
0559 S/C                L138 L127 L158 L135
0601 S/C                E167 E163 E026
0640 S/C                BC50 BC42
0641 S/C                L103 L111 L043
0650 PROBABLY WILL HOLD
0705 UNDER CONTROL